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Cicero’s earliest and most pointed critique of Stoic ethics comes from 
late in the year 63, when as consul he defended Lucius Licinius Murena, 
a candidate for the next year’s consulship, on a charge of electoral mal-
practice. Speaking to a large jury of businessmen and senators, he urged 
acquittal on grounds of expediency, arguing that Murena’s military ex-
perience was vital to the state at that troubled moment. The key to his 
defense, however, was a charge of excessive severity directed at Marcus 
Porcius Cato, the principal prosecutor in the case. In his speech Cicero 
represented Cato as a strict adherent of the ethical system taught by Ze-
no of Citium, founder of the Stoic school. He then characterized Zeno’s 
philosophy as a string of counterintuitive theses: that anyone who is 
wise is not only infallible but good-looking, rich, and a king, even if ap-
pearances are to the contrary; that anyone who is not wise is a slave, an 
exile, even insane; that any misdeed, even the needless killing of a chick-
en, is a crime as monstrous as strangling one’s own father. Cato’s aim, 
he said, was to put these outlandish principles into action in public life. 
Even if Murena had overstepped the bounds of legality, his offense 
would have been of such a kind as only a Stoic would wish to prosecute.  
If we can believe later accounts it was this description of Stoic 
thought that won, the day for Cicero. The jury hooted with laughter; 
Murena was acquitted and went on to become consul for 621. But Cice-
ro’s skillful handling of the defense won another victory as well, for by 
attacking Cato’s Stoicism, rather than Cato himself, he preserved a polit-
ical alliance with an influential patrician whose sympathies were on the 
whole very similar to his own. That alliance proved invaluable to him 
just a few days later. The trial of Murena was near the end of November, 
right in the midst of the disturbing events of the Catilinarian conspiracy, 
                                                          
1 Plut. Cat. Min. 21, 5. That the intent was humorous is also Cicero’s claim in refer-
ring to this speech in de finibus 4, 75. 
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which was at the very least a challenge to the authority of the Senate 
and a test of Cicero’s political will. On December 5, with the lives of five 
suspected conspirators at stake, it was Cato, still a junior senator, who 
stood up to Julius Caesar and turned the opinion of the Senate in Cice-
ro’s direction. The execution of the five followed immediately at Cicero’s 
behest, and the consul was hailed as savior of Rome and «father of his 
fatherland», the proudest moment of his career2.  
Unquestionably a rhetorical triumph, the speech for Murena is also of 
interest for certain philosophical issues that it raises. While many philo-
sophical systems encourage every qualified person to serve the needs of 
the larger community, it is questionable whether political leaders who 
are committed to a rigorous system of ethics can be effective in any or-
dinary political arena. It is not only that some of their views will sound 
ridiculous to non-philosophers if presented without explanation. Much 
more significantly, it is that their codes of behavior will not allow them 
to say and do the things that real-world politics might require. Though 
meaning to serve the state, they may fail to achieve the best outcomes 
for the state3. Then further, the representation of Cato’s Stoicism within 
the speech raises a question about the very nature of ethical knowledge. 
On what basis does Cato validate the ethical dicta of the foreigner Zeno, 
and how could he possibly expect a Roman jury to accept that authority? 
Can any philosophical system supply rules of conduct that are general 
enough to apply to a range of political circumstances and at the same 
time flexible and fine-grained enough to allow for a change of view as 
situations change and develop?  
In his handling of Cato in the pro Murena, Cicero explores these is-
sues from the standpoint of one who is also a philosopher, but not an 
adherent of Stoicism. Mindful of his own position, he presents Cato’s 
Stoicism as exactly the wrong way to bring philosophy into public life. 
And while the statements made within his speech in 63 are clearly con-
trolled by the rhetorical objectives of the moment, we find similar state-
ments in other writings from outside the courtroom. Personal letters da-
                                                          
2 Sources for his speech include Att. 12, 21; Sall. Cat. 52; Plut. Cat. Min. 22-23; see the 
reconstruction in Ayers 1954. Plutarch’s report that it was Cato who suggested bestow-
ing the title pater patriae (Cic. 23) is contradicted by Cicero’s own statement in Pis. 3, 6 
that the honor was bestowed by Catulus.  
3 Griffin (1988 and 1989) supplies essential background for thinking about this issue 
in a Roman context. Baraz 2012 is particularly helpful on Cicero’s self-presentation as a 
philosopher, especially in the later treatises but also within the letters.  
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ting to 61-60 again speak of Cato’s adherence to philosophical principle 
as potentially detrimental to the state, and here Cicero must be more se-
rious, since his own political program is also at issue. Yet another cri-
tique of Stoic oratory can be found in de oratore, circulated just a few 
years later in 55. In that more extensive work, the first of all his major 
treatises, Cicero gives serious attention to Stoic views, sometimes echo-
ing his earlier remarks. And here again, although his statements are 
carefully nuanced, he ultimately expresses strong objections to Stoic 
views, not only in oratory but also in moral reasoning itself.  
Significantly, Cicero in these years does not express any opposition 
to the fundamental postulate of Stoic ethics, namely that the human 
good consists in honorable conduct alone. But he does mean to bring 
out some of the problems that a strict adherence to Stoic precepts can 
create for orators and for the political process. Precisely because he 
himself seeks to craft a role for philosophy within the public discourse, 
he asks the difficult questions about how philosophy should and 
should not be used.  
 
 
1. Philosophy in the rhetoric of Pro Murena 
In order to assess Cicero’s handling of philosophical material in his 
defense of Murena, one needs to understand the circumstances in which 
the trial was held4. Cicero’s own election to the consulship of 63 had 
come about largely because the patrician nobles had supported him as a 
useful alternative to the notorious Catiline, whose platform of debt can-
cellation and redistribution of wealth they regarded as a serious threat. 
Defeated once, Catiline ran again in the summer of 63, a particularly 
heated campaign season in which charges of bribery and corruption flew 
in all directions. Three of the four candidates were implicated; the 
fourth, Servius Sulpicius, withdrew from the campaign, planning to 
bring charges against whoever should win. Murena was one of the two 
victors; the other was a relatively little-known senator named Decimus 
Iunius Silanus. At this point the frustrated Catiline embarked upon plans 
of armed insurrection, with the result that any action on the bribery 
                                                          
4 The political circumstances of the speech are reviewed in Leeman 1982; Craig 1986; 
Steel 2002, 135-39; Stem 2006; Van der Wal 2007; Fantham 2013, 3-22. More generally on 
the tensions of late 63 see Stockton 1971, Mitchell 1979, Habicht 1990. 
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scandal would have to take place against the backdrop of the military 
threat and Cicero’s efforts to combat it.  
Not everyone agreed with Cicero as to the seriousness of the dan-
ger, but more than a few were willing to be persuaded that in the cir-
cumstances it was desirable for Murena, who had extensive military 
experience, to take office regardless of any allegations against him. 
One might think, then, that Sulpicius would choose to prosecute Si-
lanus. But there was another factor. The junior senator Cato, who had 
run successfully for the tribuneship in the same election, had made a 
public declaration of his intent to prosecute one of the consular candi-
dates, and Cato could not participate in any prosecution of Silanus be-
cause of close ties with his family. Sulpicius and Cato therefore joined 
forces against Murena, one as an honest and well-qualified candidate 
defeated by shady practices, the other as a defender of principle in the 
tradition of the Cato the Elder.  
It was in Cicero’s interests to take up the defense, even though he 
himself had authored the new and strict law under which the charges 
were brought. That Murena had in fact overstepped the bounds of legali-
ty and custom seems to have been apparent: we could read this much 
from the tenor of Cicero’s defense, even if we did not have the assertions 
of later authors5. But Roman practice did not require an advocate to be-
lieve in his client’s innocence. More important to Cicero would have 
been the opportunity to collaborate once again with Quintus Hortensius 
Hortalus, the distinguished patrician orator with whom he had worked 
to defend Rabirius earlier in the year. Moreover, he would be performing 
a service for the general Lucius Licinius Lucullus, a long-time personal 
friend, who had an interest in protecting Murena as his kinsman and 
staff officer6. On the other hand, it was hardly in Cicero’s interests to of-
fend the prosecutors, especially not Cato, a rising star whose influence 
was already extensive7.  
                                                          
5 Quint. 6, 1, 35; Plut. Cat. Min. 21, 4. Steel (2002, 138) remarks that Cicero’s perora-
tion makes no mention of Murena’s being innocent. 
6 For Cicero’s relations with Hortensius and Lucullus in this period see Mitchell 1979, 
172-174. Lucullus was present at the trial and unquestionably wished to see his kinsman 
acquitted (Mur. 20). Relations with the other advocate for the defense, Marcus Licinius 
Crassus, were a different matter, for Crassus was not on good terms with the patrician 
nobles who had supported Cicero’s consular bid and had been a supporter of Catiline 
(Mitchell 1979, 166-167).  
7 Sulpicius was a personal friend – but see the comments of Leeman 1982 on the sou-
plesse of such friendships. 
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His defense was thus in an interesting position. Not only did he need 
to retain his own credibility while arguing for the acquittal of a client 
who was generally regarded as guilty, but he had to do so by going head 
to head with a man of unimpeachable character whom he could not af-
ford to alienate. His solution to this conundrum was to lean hard on the 
national security angle while doing as much as possible to arouse pity 
and sympathy for the defendant. About the actual charges he would say 
as little as possible, representing them as nuisance accusations brought 
by legalistic and (in the case of Sulpicius) self-interested prosecutors. 
Meanwhile he would do everything he could to defuse the moral author-
ity of Cato by representing that authority as derived essentially from Ca-
to’s known adherence to Stoic ethics. Cato would appear not only as 
having an interest in Stoic ideas, but actually as the Stoic sage, infallible 
and morally perfect but deficient in emotional response and in the flexi-
bility needed for good decision-making in an imperfect world. The de-
scription would compliment Cato in an extravagant way while still 
maintaining an objection to Cato’s moral stance, responsibility for which 
would be shifted onto the conveniently foreign Zeno of Citium.  
The introduction of philosophy in sections 60-65 of the speech ap-
pears to have been a flight of Cicero’s own rhetorical creativity. The an-
gle can hardly have been derived from the approach taken by the prose-
cution. That Cato had studied Stoic philosophy is not in doubt – he had a 
Greek tutor in the subject within his household, as did Cicero himself – 
and it is possible that his speech had made some mention of personal 
Stoic commitments8. But it is most unlikely that he would have present-
ed Stoic arguments to a jury as the basis on which they were to convict. 
Everything we can infer about Cato’s speech suggests that his argu-
ments, moralistic as they may have been, derived their authority solely 
from the laws applicable to the case and from familiar Roman stand-
ards of behavior9. It is Cicero, not Cato, who brings Stoic ethics into 
                                                          
8 According to Plutarch Cato had traveled to Tarsus in Asia Minor specifically to re-
cruit Athenodorus Cordylion as a tutor (Cat. Min. 10). This would have been while he 
was serving as military tribune in 70 (Rawson 1985, 82; Griffin 1989, 3-4). For Cicero’s 
own tutor see below, note 24. 
9 Cato had raised an eyebrow at Cicero’s appearing for the defense (Mur. 3), 
sneered at Murena as a «dancer» (Mur. 13), scorned Murena’s campaigning in Asia as 
«a war against women» (Mur. 31), and cast Murena’s alleged distribution of free meals 
and gladiator shows as «pandering to the senses of voters» and «softening their char-
acter with pleasures» (Mur. 74). Cato’s political program is studied in Russo 1974; see 
also Fehrle 1983. 
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the matter for adjudication, and it is he who supplies information to 
the jury about the specific doctrines that should be viewed as relevant 
to the case.  
In order to make the philosophical angle work to the advantage of his 
client, Cicero needs to cast doubt upon the moral certainty that drives 
the prosecution. He does this from the beginning of his confrontation 
with Cato by making a distinction between his opponent’s own moral 
character and the cognitive attitudes that inform his decision making. 
Cato himself is a sterling individual, a man of «exceptional and godlike 
excellences»10 whom every Roman should admire, and yet his beliefs 
and judgments may well be off base. His decision to prosecute Murena 
should not be taken as evidence of Murena’s guilt; it is only an «opin-
ion» (iudicium) and remains open to question. Not that that opinion is 
necessarily mistaken. In a surprise cat-and-mouse maneuver, Cicero ac-
tually puts forward that his opponent is not mistaken and only needs 
some minor adjustment to his view:  
 
Because I esteem your character so highly, Cato, I cannot impugn your 
decision, but perhaps I might reshape it somewhat, making some minor ad-
justments. «You are not behaving very wrongly», said the warrior’s old ad-
visor, «but you are behaving wrongly, and I can guide you». That is not 
what I say to you. The truest statement I could make is that you do not ever 
behave wrongly, you are not the sort of person who needs correction on any 
subject; what you seem to need is rather a slight change of course. 
 
What minor adjustment would bring Cato’s stance into harmony 
with Cicero’s as counsel for the defense? The question is answered just 
below. While nature has formed Cato for honorableness (honestatem), 
seriousness, self-control and every other virtue, he has subsequently ac-
quired «learning» (doctrina); that is, philosophical instruction, of a kind 
that is «neither moderate nor mild but a bit sterner and more inflexible 
than either truth or nature can endure»11. In a word, the problem is 
dogmatism. Either Cato should abandon philosophy altogether, or he 
                                                          
10 Mur. 61.  
11 Mur. 60. The passage is noteworthy as a clear instance of the internal or moral 
sense of honestas; compare honestamur in Mur. 70, which equally clearly refers to exter-
nal marks of homage. For an analysis of Republican concepts of honor and the honorable 
see Jacotot 2013, 174; for Cicero’s usage in the later philosophica, Graver 2015. 
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should adopt a less rigid philosophy, one that makes no absolute claim to 
possess the truth.  
Cicero now proceeds to describe Cato’s unfortunate philosophical 
commitments to the jury. He mentions first Zeno of Citium, «a very 
clever man», and notes that those who subscribe to his discoveries «are 
named Stoics» – as if to imply that even these well-educated jurors may 
not have heard of them12. To characterize Zeno’s thought, Cicero sup-
plies some examples of Stoic sayings and precepts: 
 
The wise person is never influenced by favor, never forgives anyone’s 
wrongdoing. Only the foolish and lightweight person experiences pity. It is 
not manly to yield to entreaty or to be appeased. The wise alone are good-
looking, even if they are severely deformed; wealthy, even if they are the 
merest beggars; kings, even if they are enslaved. We who are not wise, they 
say, are runaway slaves, exiles, enemies, even insane. All misdeeds are 
equal; every transgression is an atrocious crime. He who kills a chicken wit-
hout need is doing no less wrong than one who strangles his father. The wi-
se person does not opine, does not regret anything, is not deceived in any 
situation, never changes his mind13. 
 
Naturally Cicero makes no effort to explain or justify any of these 
claims; if anything, he insinuates that the Stoics themselves have no sat-
isfactory justification for them. Neither does he supply any reason why 
the supposedly intelligent Cato would accept such strange views. In-
stead, he presents them as maxims which Cato inexplicably treats as au-
thoritative in determining his conduct.  
Next, he sketches a series of real-life situations to which Cato is im-
agined applying his Stoic principles. These lead up gradually to the cur-
rent situation: 
 
The tax-gatherers ask for something. «Take care not to make any al-
lowance for favor». Some poor disaster-stricken people come begging for 
                                                          
12 Mur. 61. It seems likely that at least some members of the jury would have had a 
basic familiarity with the Stoic paradoxes even at this date. The points Cicero mentions 
in section 61 were enough a part of popular culture to have been mentioned in a frag-
ment of Varro’s Menippean Satires, dating probably from the seventies: «He alone is a 
king, he alone an orator, he alone handsome, strong, just to the most exacting standard, 
clean and neat» (fr. 245; see Rawson 1985, 283). Similar material in Horace, Sat. 1, 3, 120-
128, Epist. 1, 1, 106-108, is more likely to derive from the satirical tradition than from 
Cicero’s Paradoxa Stoicorum. 
13 Mur. 61.  
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aid. «You will be scandalously wicked if you do anything for them out of pi-
ty». Someone admits he has done wrong and asks to be excused for his of-
fence. «It is wicked to forgive a crime». But it is a minor offence. «All mis-
deeds are equal». You have said something. «It is fixed and immutable». But 
you were expressing an opinion, not stating a fact. «The wise person never 
opines». You make some mistake; he thinks harm was intended. On the basis 
of this teaching come the words, «I said in the Senate that I would prosecute 
one of the candidates for consul». But you spoke in anger. «The wise person 
is never angry». But you spoke provisionally. «Only a dishonest person mis-
leads others by falsehood. It is shameful to change one’s mind, a crime to 
yield to entreaty, wicked to pity anyone»14. 
 
Many of these principles are quite obviously repeated from the pre-
ceding paragraph. A careful observer will note, however, that the order 
of presentation has been altered slightly, and that three new items have 
been added. There is mention now not only of minds that cannot be 
changed but also of statements that cannot be changed, of anger, and of 
misleading others by falsehood. The additions refer to Cato’s position as 
prosecutor. Without saying so directly, Cicero implies that Cato’s deci-
sion to persist in the prosecution after his initial declaration of intent 
was founded solely on his ambition to meet the behavioral expectations 
for the Stoic sage.  
From here Cicero goes on to set up a contrast between the Stoics and 
his own philosophical teachers, the teachers he relied upon when, like 
Cato, he was a young man who did not yet trust his own intelligence. 
This second group of philosophers are not named, but are said to be 
«moderate and well-tempered people» and «followers of Plato and Aris-
totle». On two points, these philosophers hold views directly opposed to 
those of the Stoics, for they assert that pity does belong to the good man 
and that misdeeds do vary in magnitude. For the most part, however, the 
difference is not so much in the substance of their views as in the kind of 
philosophers they are. Insofar as they hold any positions in ethics, they 
also provide for exceptions to every rule. Where the Stoics hold that a 
person should never be influenced by favor, these Platonist and Aristote-
lian philosophers say that one usually should not, but sometimes may; 
where the Stoics want to eliminate all emotions from the wise person, 
these philosophers allow that the wise person may sometimes feel pity 
or anger; where the Stoics’ wise person never opines, theirs «often holds 
                                                          
14 Mur. 62. 
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an opinion on a point where he lacks knowledge» and thus will some-
times change his mind. Even the virtues in their view are «moderated by 
a certain intermediate state»15. Choosing this approach, Cicero now ad-
monishes Cato to adopt modified versions of his favorite precepts, the 
list of which has now been reduced to four:  
 
«Never forgive!» No, forgive some things but not all. «Do nothing on the 
basis of favor». No, resist favor just when responsibility and integrity require 
you to do so. «Don’t be moved by pity». Not so as to remit a penalty; nonethe-
less, it is praiseworthy to show some compassion. «Stick with the view you 
have stated». By all means, unless that view is displaced by a better one16. 
 
Indeed, Cicero alleges, this more modest approach to moral decisions 
is what the Stoic teachers actually had in mind. Their precepts were de-
liberately overstated, meant to inspire but not to be followed to the let-
ter. If one has only moderately success in following them, one will hit 
upon just the right level of morality.  
Now, whatever we think of the passage in terms of doxographical ac-
curacy, there is no question that Cicero’s presentation is rhetorically ef-
fective. His ironical and somewhat condescending tone, his repetitive list 
of maxims, his rapid-fire presentation, his humor, all serve to establish 
his authority over his younger opponent while fixing in his hearers’ 
minds the points that are advantageous to his own case. Even the most 
casual listener will have had no difficulty learning and remembering the 
main charges he seeks to establish against Cato’s philosophy. There are, 
in essence, three claims: 
 
1) Stoicism is out of touch with the realities of human nature and so-
cial interaction. Ordinary procedures in law and politics assume that 
human beings will sometimes act wrongly, but allow that some wrong-
doings are trivial and may be excused by competing considerations, in-
cluding what Cicero calls «favor». But Stoic ethics makes all distinctions 
in terms of absolutes and has no way to accommodate imperfections. It 
asks us to be superhuman, rather than human.  
                                                          
15 Mur. 63: mediocritate quadam esse moderatas. Cicero’s language recalls the Aristo-
telian mean (to meson), but of course neither Aristotle nor his followers suggested that 
one should practice moderation in virtue. In Luc. 2, 135 and Tusc. 3, 22; 3, 74; 4, 46, medi-
ocritates refers to moderate amounts of emotion as a Peripatetic byword.  
16 Mur. 65.  
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2) Stoicism cannot give a role to the emotions in decision-making. It 
forbids us to let ourselves be influenced by emotional factors when de-
ciding a course of action, and it does not allow us to excuse a past mis-
take on grounds of having acted emotionally. Those who follow it will 
thus be excluded from a dimension of human experience that most peo-
ple consider essential. 
3) Stoicism goes too far in its claims to moral knowledge. It insists on 
certainty, having no tolerance for shades of gray. Those who adhere to it 
will not be able to alter their judgments when new information comes to 
light or when relations between people change.  
 
Each of these complaints is transparently related to the case Cicero is 
building for the acquittal of Murena.  
The assertion in (1) adds force to Cicero’s claim that Cato’s prosecu-
tion is not in keeping with ordinary practice and tradition. Both ordinary 
moral intuitions and well-established principles of Roman law would 
treat an act of parricide differently from the needless killing of a chicken. 
Later in the speech, Cicero will insist that no crime has been proven 
against Murena; here, he insinuates that even if his client did go beyond 
what is permissible under the law, it is still a minor offense, one that 
does no real harm17. In addition, «favor» (gratia) was a familiar element 
in Roman social interactions. One who had performed exceptional ser-
vices for an individual or for the community could draw on a stock of 
gratitude that might be expressed in reciprocal services or in indulgence 
for minor offenses. In speaking of favor, Cicero implies that would nor-
mally build up a stock of gratitude that justifies bending the rules in 
one’s favor. As a successful military leader and a protégé of the powerful 
Lucullus, Murena is entitled to some consideration even beyond the mer-
its of his case. The ideology to which he appeals is incompatible with 
Cato’s philosophical principles that insist on the punishment stipulated 
under the law for every action that is illegal and wrong and forbid the 
jury to make any allowance for favor. But Cato’s principles also hold 
that every wise person is rich and handsome, every imperfect person in-
sane and a slave. Such perverse principles need not be countenanced – 
and so there is justification for ignoring even what Murena might per-
haps have done.  
                                                          
17 Note innocentia in section 67. 
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Equally germane to the case is the objection lodged in (2) against 
eliminating the emotions from juridical decision-making. Already in sec-
tions 55-57 Cicero had begun pleading for the mercy of the court, ex-
panding upon Murena’s unfortunate situation and asking the jury to im-
agine his feelings in that moment. Such appeals to the emotions were 
common in defense speeches, and when the case was particularly weak, 
as here, an impassioned plea of this kind was only to be expected. But 
the positioning of this initial appeal to pity so early in the speech is quite 
unusual. Cicero brings it in just after he promises to begin his response 
to the charges, as a digression or rather an interruption occasioned by 
his own strong feelings. Just after reintroducing the name of Cato, who 
has delivered the principal charges, Cicero claims that his mind has been 
stirred, suddenly, by the thought of Murena’s misfortunes: 
 
But let me first express just briefly the feelings that have arisen suddenly 
in my mind at Lucius Murena’s misfortune. For it has often happened, ju-
rors, that the miseries of others and my own worries and day-to-day labors 
have made me jealous of those who have chosen lives of leisure and tran-
quility over struggle and ambition; but these dangers that have fallen so 
heavily and unexpectedly on Murena move me so deeply that I have no 
words strong enough to express my sorrow at his misfortune and at our 
common lot18. 
 
In the version of the speech we have, as Cicero wrote it up for circu-
lation, this rather stagey gambit is brought into close contiguity with the 
attack on Cato’s philosophy by the omission of the intervening segment 
responding to the minor prosecutors. But the connection is made clear in 
any case, at the point where Cicero predicts failure for the overly ag-
gressive prosecutor via a comparison with his ancestor Cato the Elder, 
who was defeated in 149 B.C.E. by an elaborate appeal to pity on the part 
of Servius Sulpicius Galba19. The theoretical question of whether the 
wise person would ever experience pity thus carries a clear message to 
the jury: if they do not agree with the Stoics that all the emotions should 
be eliminated from human life, they should signal their disagreement by 
voting to acquit.  
                                                          
18 Mur. 55.  
19 Mur. 59. For the trial, which is mentioned again by Cicero in de orat. 1, 227-228 (on 
which see below) and Brut. 89-90, see Fantham 2004, 121-122. 
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But the most fundamental charge against Cato’s philosophy, and the 
one Cicero chooses to foreground in this segment of the speech, is the 
charge of epistemological rigidity in (3). In essence, the orator creates 
doubt about the trustworthiness of his opponent and faith in his own by 
directing attention to how action-guiding decisions are made20. Cato’s 
entire prosecution depends upon his prior judgment of Murena’s guilt, 
but that judgment has been influenced by Stoic dogmatism. If the Stoic 
approach to ethical problems promises a kind of certainty the jury finds 
problematic, then Cato’s legal judgment also comes into question. For a 
prosecutor to believe the defendant is guilty is one thing; for him to 
claim certain knowledge on that point is quite another. Since Cato is 
prohibited by his philosophy from listening to opposing arguments, 
then, says Cicero, he is not the sort of person who can give appropriate 
guidance to a jury.  
By contrast, the epistemological stance Cicero adopts as an Aca-
demic puts him in an attractive position in a court of law. A philoso-
pher who gives up on any claim to knowledge is one who can adjust 
his position as new information and new arguments come to light. His 
views are held only provisionally and are not likely to interfere with 
established Roman judicial procedures. Indeed, his position may be that 
of the thoroughgoing skeptic, so long as he speaks for the defense. As 
Jürgen Leonhardt has observed, there is a natural affinity between 
philosophical skepticism, which declines ever to make positive asser-
tions and seeks only to dismantle the arguments of an opponent, and 
courtroom defense, which bears no burden except to refute the claims 
made by the prosecution21. Accordingly, Cicero never asserts that Ca-
to’s judgment concerning Murena was incorrect. He does not have to 
prove that his client is innocent: it is enough for him, speaking for the 
defense, if he can persuade the jury that the claims of the prosecutor 
are unproven. In following his advice, the jury will only be rejecting an 
extreme position, not committing itself to any definite stand on the 
guilt or innocence of Murena. 
Later in the speech, Cicero introduces one further point against Ca-
to’s Stoicism. After dealing with the more substantive vote-buying 
                                                          
20 We can recognize this gambit as an epistemological version of the appeal to the 
character of the speaker (ethos) that is the second of the three modes of persuasion laid 
out in Book 1 of Aristotle’s Rhetoric and also in Book 2 of Cicero’s own de oratore. May 
1988 discusses the pro Murena in terms of Cicero’s appeal to ethos. 
21 Leonhardt 1986, 28-29. 
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charges against Murena, he takes up his opponent’s complaint that 
Murena has won votes by currying goodwill with dinners and other 
pleasurable enticements. He labels this an «austere and Stoic» way of 
conducting the case, setting it in contrast with ancestral Roman cus-
tom22. His aim now is to set Cato’s appeal to moral principle in contrast 
with what he calls «reality and ancestral custom» (res ipsa … diuturni-
tas); the latter is itself a reality that public figures have to deal with. 
High standards lose much of their meaning if they are in conflict with 
facts, including political facts. Cicero’s case in point is a Stoic of an earli-
er generation, Quintus Aelius Tubero, the nephew of Scipio Aemilianus. 
On the occasion of Scipio’s funeral, Tubero, «a deeply learned man and a 
Stoic», provided goatskin coverlets and earthenware for the funeral, ra-
ther than the usual rich textiles and silver table service, thus treating the 
death of the great Africanus «as if it were that of Diogenes the Cynic»23. 
This display of philosophical seriousness offended the Roman people, 
with the result that Tubero was defeated in his subsequent bid for the 
praetorship. And Cato’s own career provides a further illustration, for 
Cato has employed a nomenclator (a prompter to remind him of the 
names of voters) during the recent election – a practice that runs coun-
ter to his principle of strict honesty, but that is sanctioned by long-
standing electoral custom. Cicero does not charge his opponent with hy-
pocrisy for this; on the contrary, he asserts that all such practices, when 
regulated by the reasoning (rationem) of the state, are entirely right (rec-
ta). It is the reasoning of the philosopher that is misguided. 
 
 
2. Cicero’s attitude toward Stoicism in the late 60’s 
 
Readers of the pro Murena should keep firmly in mind that the atti-
tudes the orator expresses are not necessarily his personal views but are 
those he believes will be most likely to persuade a jury. But the speech 
may still be indicative of Cicero’s more general attitude toward Stoic 
thought in this period of his life, if the points he selects for inclusion are 
considered in relation to the larger body of knowledge he must have 
possessed. It is of interest also when we find some elements of the pro 
Murena critique repeated in other contexts, both in Cicero’s personal 
                                                          
22 Mur. 74. 
23 Mur. 75. For Roman attitudes toward Cynicism see Griffin 1996. 
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correspondence and in his rhetorical and political treatises. To under-
stand his attitude toward Cato as an adherent of Stoicism, we need to 
take in this larger intellectual picture.  
Of particular interest is what the pro Murena does not say about Stoic 
ethics. Cicero had studied philosophy since his youth, and he retained in 
his household a Greek Stoic, Diodotus, as his tutor in dialectical 
method24. There can be little doubt that at the time he wrote pro Murena 
he was already fully conversant with the central tenets of Stoic ethics as 
known to us from other sources and from his own later works25. If he 
had wanted to include such points as the supremacy of reason or the in-
trinsic value of justice and the other virtues, he was capable of doing so. 
But these core tenets of Stoicism did not afford him any opening for at-
tack; indeed, they were as important to the followers of Plato and Aristo-
tle as they were to the Stoics. Still less does he wish to mention the Stoic 
arguments favoring a life of public service over the life of study and con-
templation. This was a point that must surely have caught his attention, 
but one that would leave him at a disadvantage relative to Cato, since 
the philosophers of his own camp held the opposite view26.  
By far the most striking omission, however, is of the trademark claim 
of Stoic ethics, the point that sets the Stoics apart from other ancient 
schools: that «honorable conduct alone is good» and that the so-called 
goods of the body and of estate are entirely extrinsic to happiness. This 
claim could be regarded as paradoxical in just the same sense as «only 
the wise is free» or «all fools are insane»; that is, it was a thesis contrary 
to common opinion, one that only careful explanation could render 
plausible. Cicero evidently regarded it as the most characteristic of the 
Stoic doctrines, for when he writes the Paradoxa Stoicorum (circulated in 
46), he presents it first among all the paradoxes. In the de finibus, Cice-
ro’s major treatise on Greek ethics written in 45, it is vastly more im-
                                                          
24 As Diodotus died in 59 (Att. 2, 20, 6) he would presumably have been present in 
Cicero’s house at the time of the speech; his tutelage must have begun considerably ear-
lier (see Brutus 309). 
25 The pro Murena itself attests to the depth of his knowledge in that it mentions not 
only the paradoxes (which were known already to Varro, see note 12) and the equality of 
all misdeeds (which may have figured in early satire; cf. Hor. Sat. 1, 3, 115-119) but also 
the lack of regret among the wise, a relatively obscure point that is attested only in Stob. 
2, 7, 102 and 112 and in Sen. Ben. 4, 34.  
26 The arguments for and against political participation by philosophers were famil-
iar terrain in Hellenistic philosophy and were probably known to Cicero even before 60-
59, when he read the works by Dicaearchus and Theophrastus on the subject (Att. 2, 2, 2; 
2, 12, 4; 2, 16, 3). For discussion see Boyancé 1967; Lévy 2012; McConnell 2012.  
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portant than any other paradox. Its absence in the pro Murena is thus 
very noticeable. To be sure, this high-minded assertion has less satiric 
bite than the one that makes Roman senators into runaway slaves or the 
one that makes chicken-strangling equivalent to parricide. Still, Stoic 
ethics is scarcely recognizable without it, and that, at least, should have 
been known not only to such men as Crassus and Lucullus but indeed to 
anyone who had even a smattering of education in philosophy. In Cato’s 
eyes, and in the eyes of anyone else who found the Stoic position com-
pelling, Cicero’s avoidance of it would amount to a concession. 
On some other points, however, the criticisms of Stoic ethics in the 
pro Murena bear a close resemblance to points made in the later philo-
sophical works. The complaint that Stoicism is out of touch with the re-
alities of human nature, asking us to be superhuman rather than human, 
is closely related to an objection voiced in de finibus 4, 28. There, Cicero 
is responding in his own voice to the account of Stoic ethics given in 
Book 3 by the embedded speaker «Cato». As in pro Murena 60, the Stoic 
claims prove to be too radical to accord with human nature. «The only 
way that the highest good could be said to consist in virtue alone would 
be if there were some creature made up entirely of intellect». The same 
point is made more briefly in the first version of the Academics, titled 
Lucullus, where Zeno is referred to ironically as «a god»27. More broad-
ly, the complaint of pro Murena 61, that the Stoic sage is credited with a 
more definite and irrefutable form of knowledge than is attainable for 
human beings, is developed at great length in the Lucullus. That skepti-
cal strain was to become a central feature of Cicero’s philosophical 
stance even as late as de officiis28.  
Meanwhile, there is one element of the pro Murena critique that 
matches closely with a pressing concern of Cicero’s own political life. 
Again it is a problem with the fit between Stoic ethics and the realities of 
human nature, between all-or-nothing principles and the complexities 
and ambiguities of real situations. During the years immediately follow-
ing his consulship, Cicero often found himself dealing with just that 
problem in his legislative work, as he attempted to preserve a fragile 
coalition of senators and equestrians in the face of disruptive legislation 
by certain powerful tribunes. His influence within the Senate was signif-
icant, but not unquestioned; Cato was, in general, an ally, but his strict 
                                                          
27 Luc. 134, adding ille vereor ne virtuti plus tribuat quam natura patiatur. 
28 See Off. 2, 7-8. 
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ethical stance sometimes proved awkward29. In his letters to Atticus, 
Cicero expresses his frustration with Cato’s political choices, linking 
those choices to Cato’s known interests in philosophy. 
One major issue had to do with penalties for jurors who had accepted 
bribes. Because of an anomaly in Roman law, members of the equestrian 
order who served on juries were immune from prosecution for accepting 
bribes. Cato and some others were interested in revoking this immunity; 
the equestrians, not surprisingly, were up in arms30. A second issue, aris-
ing around the same time, concerned a request from an association of 
publicani or tax-gatherers, businessmen who had contracted with the 
Senate for the privilege of collecting taxes in the province of Asia. The 
contract was in accordance with standard Roman procedure, but a sub-
sequent request was not. Having bid high to win the contract, the publi-
cani were now requesting that the price they had agreed upon should be 
altered retroactively in their favor31. Again, the measure was favored by 
the equestrian order, and again Cato had made his opposition clear. 
Cicero, for his part, had chosen to support the equestrians on both is-
sues. He had no sympathy at all for their position; quite the contrary. 
But he was concerned above all for the Senate’s ability to preserve the 
rule of law in the fraying Republic. To that end, he felt it was essential to 
retain the cooperation of a large and powerful constituency. 
Cato’s opposition he found understandable, yet also ill-judged. Cato 
«has more consistency and integrity than he has of sound political 
judgment or intelligence», he writes to Atticus in January of 6032. In the 
same connection he calls Cato «that hero of ours»33. The latter remark 
sounds like admiration, but in fact it is laced with irony: heroes in classi-
cal mythology were counted as semi-divine, and political ideals so lofty 
as to rank one among the gods are something of a liability in a legisla-
tive body composed of human beings. Then in June of 60, referring to a 
speech made by Cato in the Senate, Cicero writes,  
 
                                                          
29 On Cicero’s relations with Cato during these years see Mitchell 1991, 88-90; Gruen 
1972, 53-55; Gelzer 1963. 
30 Att. 1, 17, 8; 1, 18, 3; 2, 1, 8. 
31 The economic and political implications were very significant; see Badian 1972, 99-
105. Even in 43 Cicero remembers the controversy as vital to the public interest (Off. 3, 88).  
32 Att. 1, 17, 9.  
33 Att. 1, 18, 7.  
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My love for Cato is as great as yours; all the same, despite having the 
best of intentions and a deep sense of loyalty, he sometimes does harm to 
the Republic, for he states his views as if he were in the Republic of Plato 
and not amidst the dregs of Romulus. What could be more proper than that 
a person who has taken money to deliver a verdict should be subject to pro-
secution? Cato proposed as much, and the Senate agreed to it – and the 
equestrians have declared war upon the Senate-House, though not on me, 
for I voted against the measure. What could be more shameless than for the 
tax-gatherers to renege on their contract? But it was a loss we ought to have 
borne, to preserve our alliance with the equestrians. Cato objected and car-
ried the day, and now with a consul in jail and one riot following another we 
have nothing at all from those on whose support I and subsequent consuls 
used to rely when defending the state. «What then? Shall we buy their sup-
port for money?» What if we have no other way of getting it?34  
 
Cicero’s rather shocking suggestion that the cooperation of the 
equestrians should be retained by bribery, if need be, is merely a rede-
scription of what the equestrians had in fact demanded. That he would 
entertain such a notion is an indication of the seriousness with which he 
viewed the threat of civil strife. If Cato had lived among the philosophi-
cally-trained guardians of Plato’s Republic, there would have been no 
need for any such concessions. In a real state, the «dregs» – Cicero’s 
colorful metaphor for those whom he considered the lower element in 
politics – might need to be accommodated35.  
As before, we are not required to believe that Cato’s speech before 
the Senate had made any explicit mention of either Plato or the Stoics. 
The remark about Plato’s Republic is more likely to be Cicero’s own re-
flection on Cato’s self-representation as a staunch defender of Roman 
values. Still, it is not a remark Cicero would have made about just any 
speaker who took a moralistic line. His framing of Cato in philosophical 
terms is suggested to him by his perception of Cato’s Stoic commitment: 
it reacts to a consistent pattern of behavior in one whom he knows to 
have had an interest in Greek philosophy. From our perspective, the re-
mark may seem to have been misapplied: why is a known Stoic linked to 
Plato rather than to Zeno or Chrysippus? It should be remembered, 
                                                          
34 Att. 2, 1, 8. 
35 Faex or ‘dregs’ is the bitter sediment left at the bottom of a wine-jar, or any simi-
larly disagreeable residue, a frequent metaphor of Cicero’s for the lower element in poli-
tics (e.g. Flacc. 8; Pis. 9; Att. 1, 16, 11; Fam. 7, 32, 2). Bailey 1965-1970 renders «the cess-
pool of Romulus», not literally but with sensitivity to Cicero’s thought. 
84 MARGARET GRAVER 
however, that Plato’s Republic was the central text of the Greek tradition 
for the intrinsic value of moral behavior. Not wishing at this point to dif-
ferentiate one school from another, Cicero invokes the work simply for 
its ethical content and for its utopian character36. 
It must have been at around the time of this speech of Cato to the 
Senate that Cicero chose finally to produce a written version of the pro 
Murena for circulation. The date of circulation is not attested by any di-
rect evidence, but can be inferred from what appears to be an alteration 
in the content of the speech37. We have seen that at one point in the pro 
Murena, Cicero represents Cato’s internal dialogue upon receiving an 
improper request from the tax-gatherers: 
 
The tax-gatherers ask for something. «Take care not to make any allow-
ance for favor»38. 
 
For the political situation in 63, this is anachronistic, for it was only 
the request made by the publicani in 61 that brought Cato into conflict 
with them: before that time, they had been strong supporters of his ca-
reer39. Boulanger must therefore be right to conclude that the mention of 
the publicani was added to the speech when it was written up for circu-
lation, at a moment when the tax-gatherers’ request was a significant 
political issue. This suggests that the circulation of the speech was a 
comment on Cato’s obstructionism. Dismayed at Cato’s opposition to 
legislation he considered essential, Cicero made use of this portion of his 
consular record as propaganda. The representation of Cato as the inflex-
ible Stoic had been effective in securing Murena’s acquittal; it could be 
effective again in rescuing the measure Cato opposed.  
 
 
                                                          
36 In Q.Fr. 1, 1, 29, dating to about a year later, Cicero compares his brother’s gover-
norship of the province of Asia to the rule of the philosopher-king in Plato’s Republic, 
and hints that his own consulship was likewise an instance of philosophical rule. The 
remark is a compliment, in a pamphlet meant for circulation; it has no specific implica-
tions for policy. 
37 The suggestion was first made in Boulanger 1940 and has generally been accepted. 
Leeman (1982, 194) argues convincingly against earlier suggestions of large-scale amend-
ments in the speech, but his reasons for rejecting Boulanger’s argument underestimate the 
political significance of relations with the publicani. See further Stem 2006, 226.  
38 Mur. 62. 
39 Att. 1, 18, 7 (Feb. 60): miseros publicanos quos habuit amantissimos sui tertium iam 
mensem vexat. 
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3. The Stoics of De Oratore 
 
A further point of comparison for the critique of Stoicism in pro 
Murena is to be found in the treatise de oratore, the earliest of Cicero’s 
major theoretical works. Despite the lapse of time (for the treatise was 
not finished until 55), several close thematic connections indicate that 
his earlier thoughts on the subject had not left his mind40. These are not 
merely repeated, however, but are tied into a much broader array of 
thoughts about the importance of public speaking in political life and 
about Cicero’s own contribution as a talented speaker with an unusually 
extensive education. Within this work, the objection to Stoicism in pub-
lic life is framed entirely in terms of effective communication. Whether 
or not the Stoics are correct in the substance of their ethical position, the 
nature of their philosophical discourse typically makes it impossible for 
them to achieve any worthwhile political objectives.  
The structure of the dialogue is unusual in that there are two princi-
pal speakers, both of whom represent the voice of the author to some ex-
tent. One, Cicero’s teacher Lucius Licinius Crassus, consistently espous-
es the view Cicero himself takes in the proem, that the ideal public 
speaker is one who is knowledgeable in all fields of study, not only in 
the standard techniques of persuasion, but also in history, law, and phi-
losophy. The other, Marcus Antonius, is more changeable. In Book 1, he 
takes up a position opposing Licinius Crassus, but this, we are told, is 
not his real view: he is merely exercising his faculty for refutation, imi-
tating the philosophers of the skeptical Academy41. His true position is 
in agreement with that of Licinius Crassus. 
The use of philosophy by orators becomes an issue early on in the 
first major speech of Antonius42. Reacting to Licinius Crassus’s view 
that the orator must have knowledge of all subjects, Antonius relates 
how he himself visited Athens a decade before the dialogue takes place 
and spent time with representatives of the various philosophical 
schools, learning about their views on oratory and orators. In particu-
lar, he draws a contrast between the Stoic Mnesarchus and the Aca-
demic philosopher Charmadas. Mnesarchus had stated that those who 
                                                          
40 The project was completed in early winter of 55 (Att. 4, 13, 2). 
41 De orat. 1, 263; cf. de orat. 2, 39-40. For the structure of de oratore and for the role of 
philosophy within the work see Wisse 2002; for the structure of Book 1 in particular, 
Leeman 1975; on the role of the New, or Skeptical, Academy Lévy 1992, 84-87. 
42 De orat. 1, 82-95.  
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are commonly called orators are mere mechanics; that real eloquence is 
a virtue in itself; and that the true orator is necessarily a wise person 
who possesses all the virtues – in other words, a Stoic sage. Antonius 
does not comment on these views; instead, he remarks on Mnes-
archus’s style of speaking, that it was «a thorny and bare speech, quite 
alien to our sensibilities»43. He much preferred the discourse of Char-
madas, which likewise made the ideal orator a man learned in philoso-
phy. Charmadas himself was not committed to the view, for like other 
Academics of the period he did not take any positions of his own; 
nonetheless, he defended the pro-philosophy position at length against 
a challenge by the Athenian politician Menedemus. It was after hearing 
Charmadas refute Menedemus that Antonius wrote his own short trea-
tise on oratory, in which he sketched a portrait of the ideal orator as a 
man learned in philosophy44. 
Later in Book 1, however, Antonius takes the opposite position, argu-
ing against Crassus that philosophical study is quite unnecessary to the 
orator. In sections 219-224, he says that such study may be counterpro-
ductive, for it siphons off energies that the orator may need for the skills 
specific to his discipline. Worse, the ethical commitments of some philo-
sophical systems might induce one to choose strategies that are doomed 
to failure. Because an orator often needs to intensify the passions of his 
audience, he will certainly not agree with those philosophers who say 
that «there should be no emotions at all, and those who stir emotions in 
the minds of the jurors do a wicked deed»; and he will have no time ei-
ther for those who say that the emotions «should be very moderate or 
rather slight»45. A good orator does not want to appear as a wise person 
or to make his audience seem to be fools – and he does not want to give 
the impression of being «inept and a bit of a Greek»46. His speeches 
would never inquire into such central points of ethics as whether the 
highest good is in the mind or in the body, and equally he would refrain 
from epistemological inquiries such as whether knowledge is possible 
and whether there is any graspable impression. And where Licinius 
Crassus had claimed that the orator often needs to treat the same kinds 
                                                          
43 De orat. 1, 83. Mnesarchus was mentioned already in Crassus’s speech at 1, 45; he 
was a pupil of Panaetius and a contemporary of Critolaus. 
44 Lévy points out (1992, 85) that Cicero seems to have had a low opinion of Antoni-
us’s book, since in Brut. 163 he calls it «pretty thin» (sane exilem). 
45 De orat. 1, 220. 
46 De orat. 1, 221. 
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of general principles of justice as are treated by philosophers47, Antonius 
objects that it is actually a liability for a speaker to borrow from Plato 
when he speaks of justice and loyalty.  
 
What we need is a smart person whose cleverness comes of nature and 
experience, one who observes keenly the beliefs, thoughts, opinions, and ex-
pectations of his fellow-citizens and those whom he is seeking to persuade. 
He should feel the pulse of every kind, age-group, and class of people before 
whom he is to plead his cases, tasting in advance their thoughts and feelings. 
But as for the books of the philosophers, he should save them for his times 
of rest and leisure at some place like this Tusculan villa. Otherwise, when he 
needs to speak about justice and loyalty, he might find himself borrowing 
from Plato, who when he tried to put these things into words invented a 
new sort of republic in his books, because his idea of what one ought to say 
about justice was so far removed from ordinary life and civic practice48. 
 
If there had been any broad-based support for Plato’s understanding 
of justice, then Licinius Crassus himself would never have been able to 
speak as he did in defense of the Servilian Law, saying that the members 
of the Senate were «in miseries» and «enslaved» by their enemies. For 
those philosophers whose authority Crassus has invoked claim that a 
courageous person cannot ever be miserable, that a wise person cannot 
be injured, and that «virtue always and alone is free», even if the body is 
in chains. Nor would even a hedonist philosopher say what Crassus said 
on that occasion, that the members of the Senate ought to be enslaved to 
the people. Anyone who was a philosopher would remember that rulers 
guide and direct the people because given that role by the people them-
selves, who metaphorically hand over the reins of power49.  
Antonius is speaking about philosophical knowledge quite generally, 
for he mentions or alludes to several different schools, and he refers to 
Plato’s Republic as the shared heritage of all subsequent schools of phi-
losophy50. It is clear, though, that his principal targets are the Stoics, or 
rather orators who speak from a Stoic standpoint. It is the Stoics who 
advocate the complete elimination of the emotions both from the ora-
tor’s mind and from the minds of the audience, and Antonius relies on a 
                                                          
47 De orat. 1, 56. 
48 De orat. 1, 223-224. 
49 De orat. 1, 226. 
50 Even for Stoics, who differed from Plato on several essential points, the Republic 
was a seminal work: see for instance Vander Waerdt 1994; Long 2013.  
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Stoic account of the causes of emotion when he speaks of exaggerating 
the importance of common objects of pursuit and avoidance51. There is an 
allusion to Stoic claims also in his comments about not making one’s au-
dience appear to be fools, for it is the Stoics who hold that everyone who 
falls short of wisdom is necessarily classed with the foolish. His account of 
the philosophical objections to Licinius Crassus’ speech on the Servilian 
law again makes reference to Stoic thought, for it was the Stoics who held 
that the virtuous person cannot be miserable, that the wise are not suscep-
tible to injury, and that only the wise person is free. The last of these is in-
deed one of the Stoic paradoxes mentioned in the pro Murena.  
That Antonius’s real target is the Stoic-minded orator becomes even 
clearer when he goes on to describe how Licinius Crassus’s speech was 
received by Publius Rutilius Rufus, «a learned person who was devoted 
to philosophy», who found Crassus’s case to be «not only unsuitable but 
also shameful and even scandalous»52. Rutilius is not labeled by Antoni-
us as an adherent of Stoicism, but his adherence (which is made explicit 
later in Brutus 116) is assumed throughout the relevant passage. Rutilius 
speaks as a Stoic both in his reaction to Crassus’s speech and in his criti-
cism of another contemporary, Servius Sulpicius Galba, for evoking pity 
in the jury in order to secure an acquittal53. Even exile or death, says Ru-
tilius, is preferable to the «degradation» of playing on the emotions of 
the jury in this way. The same Stoic orientation proves to be disastrous 
in a later trial in which Rutilius himself was the defendant. Haled into 
court by the unprincipled publicani of his own generation, Rutilius fol-
lowed through on his objections to the pity defense, refusing to stir up 
the emotions of the jury and instead presenting only the plain facts.  
 
The case was conducted as if the trial were being held in the fictional re-
public of Plato. Not one of the advocates groaned; not one cried out; not one 
was aggrieved or uttered a complaint; not one called upon the Republic or 
bent the knee. Why say more? No one stamped his foot at that trial – I sup-
pose lest he be reported to the Stoics54. 
 
                                                          
51 De orat. 1, 221. 
52 De orat. 1, 227. Rutilius was consul in 105; his conviction de repetundis took place 
in 92 (CAH 9), the year before the dramatic date of de oratore. The nature of the case may 
have been quite different from what Cicero believed; see Fantham 2004, 42-44; Kallet-
Marx 1990; Badian 1972, 89-92. 
53 See note 19 above. 
54 De orat. 1, 230 (the parallel to Att. 2, 1, 8 is pointed out by Bailey 1965-1970 ad loc.).  
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The result was that Rutilius lost his case, as Socrates had done before 
him. His integrity was beyond question: Antonius clearly admires him 
for that, just as he admires Socrates, «the wisest of human beings and 
one who conducted himself with great integrity»55. For the purposes 
proper to oratory, however, the philosopher is at a disadvantage. Socra-
tes would have done better to make use of a speech ghostwritten for him 
by the accomplished rhetorician Lysias, and Rutilius would have been 
acquitted if Licinius Crassus had spoken on his behalf. That is to say, he 
would have been acquitted if Crassus had spoken in the emotional man-
ner for which he was noted, not in the philosophical manner he seems to 
favor within the dialogue. Antonius thus concludes that even if philoso-
phy is better and truer than oratory, it is a different discipline, and one 
can become a consummate orator without it. 
Now, all this is expressed quite persuasively, and yet it has already 
been made clear that this speech by Antonius does not represent his true 
opinion of philosophical knowledge. In fact, the situation is doubly iron-
ical, for not only has Antonius been arguing for a position other than his 
own, but his very practice of arguing both sides of a question reflects the 
influence of Athenian philosophy. After Antonius’s long speech is over, 
Licinius Crassus is made to complain that his challenger is «making the 
orator into some kind of mechanic» – which is to say that he sees a re-
semblance to the Athenian orators criticized by Mnesarchus. He sus-
pects, however, that Antonius is merely exercising his «marvelous habit 
of refutation», a custom that belongs properly to orators but that has re-
cently become the practice of philosophers, especially those «whose cus-
tom it is to argue with great fullness on both sides of every suggested 
topic»56. Antonius is thus aligned once again with Charmadas, the skep-
tical Academic: he has made the case against philosophy where Char-
madas made the case in favor, but either of them could just as well have 
taken the opposite position.  
Still, Antonius differs from Charmadas in one important respect. 
Charmadas, as an Academic in the tradition of Carneades, speaks on 
both sides of the question in order to raise questions about any claim to 
certain knowledge on one side or the other. Antonius, despite his skill in 
refutation, is no Academic. Where Charmadas had argued the positive 
position merely to make a point, he, Antonius, truly accepts that posi-
                                                          
55 De orat. 1, 231. 
56 De orat. 1, 263. 
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tion and puts his name on the line for it in a formal treatise. In terms of 
commitment he is again in agreement with the Stoic Mnesarchus, whose 
claims about the orator provide the basis for the positive view. His un-
derstanding may not be identical with that of Mnesarchus, for Charma-
das’s speech does not seem to have incorporated all of the points made 
earlier by the Stoic. But Antonius certainly takes after Mnesarchus in be-
lieving that true eloquence requires real knowledge of theology, human 
psychology, justice, and various ethical topics – knowledge which can 
only be acquired from the philosophers57.  
At this point it seems as though Antonius’s attack on Stoic philoso-
phy must have no force at all. The view of Mnesarchus may not have 
won the day entirely, but important components of it have been en-
dorsed by both the principal speakers, and it was only for the sake of ar-
gument that complaints were made against an orator whose notion of 
justice seems to have been borrowed from Plato’s Republic. By the be-
ginning of Book 2 it appears that the ideal orator who Cicero thinks 
should guide the state not only needs philosophical knowledge but 
might indeed be committed to Stoic ethics. But the remainder of de ora-
tore does not follow through on this conception. Licinius Crassus does 
argue that the orator needs philosophical knowledge, but when he 
comes to specifics, he largely repeats what Antonius said in Book 1.  
 
As for the Stoics, I have no objection to them at all, but still I set them 
aside, not fearing any anger from them, for they do not know how to get 
angry at all. I am in fact grateful to them, since they are the only ones of all 
the philosophers to say that eloquence is a virtue and is wisdom. But it is 
obvious that there is something about them that is greatly at odds with the 
orator we are equipping for his task.  
In the first place, they say that all who are not wise are slaves, robbers, 
enemies, insane, but also that no one is wise. It would be quite absurd to ent-
rust an assembly, a meeting of the Senate, or any gathering of people to one 
who thinks that none of those in attendance is of sound mind or a citizen or 
a free person.  
In addition, although their manner of speaking is certainly intelligent 
and perhaps sophisticated, for an orator it is bare, peculiar, alien to the ears 
of the common people, obscure, empty, and barren. And in any case, it is of 
                                                          
57 Charmadas spoke only «on these same matters», and his claim about arousing the 
emotions does not agree with the Stoic view, at least as Antonius represents it. It is 
worth noting, however, that Cicero in Tusc. 4, 55 claims that an orator working on Stoic 
principles might feign anger in order to rouse his hearers to action.  
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a sort one could never use before the common people, for what Stoics consi-
der to be good and bad things are not the same as what their fellow citizens 
and indeed all people have in mind, and the meanings of honor, disgrace, 
reward, and punishment are different in their eyes. Whether they are right 
or wrong is not our present concern, but if we were to follow in their foots-
teps, we would never be able to explain anything in our speeches58.  
 
Crassus respects the Stoic claims in theory, but in practice finds that 
the specialized nature of their discourse makes it impossible for an ora-
tor who works from a Stoic standpoint to achieve his objectives among 
fellow-citizens who do not share his perspective. The problem is not 
merely that the style typically employed by Stoic speakers and writers is 
overly intellectual, but that their understanding of how central terms of 
ethics are to be applied is so far from ordinary usage as to leave no ave-
nue of communication open. At the end of the day the Stoic might be 
right about what those terms have to mean, but his oratory will still be 
ineffective, and effectiveness in real situations is a precondition for ex-
cellence in oratory.  
 
 
5. Assessing the Stoic orator 
 
It is evident, then, how Cicero’s treatment of philosophy in de oratore 
echoes the critique of Stoicism he had made eight years earlier in the pro 
Murena. Both in Antonius’s speech in Book 1 and in Licinius Crassus’s 
authoritative pronouncement in Book 3, the public speaker who works 
on Stoic principles is out of touch with ordinary moral intuitions and 
unable to use any form of emotional appeal. Antonius’s speech also re-
peats the charge Cicero had made against Cato in his letter, that of 
speaking «as if he were in the Republic of Plato». In large part, the con-
cerns of de oratore are those of a rhetorical treatise, having most to do 
with the efficacy of different ways of speaking. Antonius’s complaint 
about Mnesarchus was that his speech was «thorny and bare», not that 
it was wrong-headed, and Crassus is likewise concerned that the Stoics’ 
precise manner of speaking and penchant for paradoxical formulations is 
ill-suited for persuasion. But the issue is not solely one of rhetorical ef-
fectiveness. Publius Rutilius Rufus, the paradigm of the ineffectual Stoic 
                                                          
58 De orat. 3, 65. 
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orator, is at fault not only because he failed to persuade his audience, but 
because in doing so he allowed injustice to prevail. Given the circum-
stances with which he was faced, Rutilius could very well be considered 
to have made the wrong decision. In much the same way, Cato more 
than once pursued a philosophically motivated course of action that Cic-
ero regards as not just doomed to failure but actually detrimental to the 
state. There were some occasions when Cato carried the day, for Cato 
was also an effective speaker despite his Stoic allegiance59. On those oc-
casions, in Cicero’s view, his adherence to philosophical principle made 
matters worse, not better. 
I maintain that neither pro Murena nor de oratore gives evidence of an 
across-the-board rejection of Stoic ethical thought. Forensic oratory is 
unilateral by nature: it is expected that the orator will present only one 
side of the case and will leave any points that might support the opposite 
conclusion to his opponent. Likewise Antonius’s speech in Book 1 of de 
oratore is to be understood as one-sided from the start. We are meant to 
see that Antonius is arguing back and forth in the Academic manner and 
will eventually reverse his position. What is telling in these attacks is 
not in what Cicero finds to say against Stoicism, but in what he declines 
to say. Neither work raises any objection at all to the most fundamental 
of the Stoic paradoxes: that no form of conduct is good if it is not honor-
able. That central contention of Stoic ethics is carefully left untouched, 
and Cicero indeed draws attention to his respectful handling, when he 
makes Antonius refuse to quarrel about whether oratory or philosophy 
is «better or truer», and again when he has Crassus remark that he has 
«no objection at all» to the Stoics60.  
Even so, this group of writings does present Cicero’s readers with a 
serious question about how moral reasoning is to be done. Cicero is in-
clined in this phase of his career to think of Stoic ethics in terms of 
moral rules, action types that are either required or forbidden. The two 
cases at issue in the letters of 61-60 are especially revealing in this re-
gard. Cato has made a straightforward application of basic precepts: 
corrupt jurors should be subject to prosecution; those who have made 
contracts with the state should be required to honor them. Cicero op-
                                                          
59 As Cicero remarks in Paradoxa Stoicorum pref. 1-3 and again in Brutus 118-119. 
For Cato’s success in the Senate battles of early 60, see Att. 2, 1, 8. (The measure re-
moving juridical immunity from the equestrian order was ultimately rejected by the 
popular assembly.) 
60 De orat. 1, 233; 3, 65. 
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poses both measures, yet his doing so is not a dismissal of all ethical 
principle from the political realm. His position is rather that ethical de-
cision-making requires consideration of a wider range of particulars: in 
this case, the reality of civil strife, the need to preserve a delicate coali-
tion among government leaders, and also the corrupt preferences of 
the publicani. In this more complicated moral landscape, a good deci-
sion will sometimes violate the simple moral intuition. A defendant 
whose guilt is obvious will sometimes go unpunished; greedy publicans 
will sometimes be allowed to violate their contracts. In a word, pre-
cepts and prohibitions that refer to specific action types are always de-
feasible in specific situations.  
This way of thinking about moral reasoning may not, in fact, have 
been very different from that of the earliest Stoics, for Zeno and Chry-
sippus themselves held that virtually any action can be justified on the 
basis of a thorough understanding of the situation61. As Cicero presents 
it, however, the effective Stoic position on these matters was that repre-
sented in Roman public life by such figures as Rutilius, Tubero, and Ca-
to. His own more flexible stance was to benefit by the comparison62. 
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